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The following articles are merged in Scholar. Their combined citations are counted only for the first article. Merged citations. This "Cited by" count includes citations to the following articles in Scholar.

Add co-authors Co-authors. Upload PDF. Follow this author. New articles by this author. New citations to this author. New articles related to this author's research. He never mentions the ancient criticisms that we cannot accept responsibility for chance decisions. He does not really care for chance as the origin of species, preferring a more deterministic and continuous lawful development, under the guidance of evolutionary love.

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But Peirce does say clearly, well before Exner, that the observational evidence simply does not establish determinism. It remained for William James , Peirce's close friend, to assert that chance can provide random unpredictable alternatives from which the will can choose or determine one alternative. James was the first thinker to enunciate clearly a two-stage decision process, with chance in a present time of random alternatives, leading to a choice which selects one alternative and transforms an equivocal ambiguous future into an unalterable determined past. There are undetermined alternatives followed by adequately determined choices.

This notion of alternative possibility, this admission that any one of several things may come to pass is, after all, only a roundabout name for chance What is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk home after the lecture is ambiguous and matter of chance? It means that both Divinity Avenue and Oxford Street are called but only one, and that one either one, shall be chosen. Chance is critically important for the question of free will because strict necessity implies just one possible future. Absolute chance means that the future is fundamentally unpredictable at the levels where chance is dominant.

Chance allows alternative futures and the question becomes how the one actual present is realized from these potential alternative futures. The amount of chance and the departure from strict causality required for free will is very slight compared to the miraculous ideas often associated with the " causa sui " self-caused cause of the ancients. For medieval philosophers, only God could produce a causa sui , a miracle. Modern quantal randomness, unless amplified to the macroscopic world, is often insignificant, not a miracle at all.

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Despite David Hume's critical attack on causality, many philosophers embrace causality strongly, including Hume himself in his other writings, where he dogmatically asserts "'tis impossible to admit of any medium betwixt chance and an absolute necessity. Bertrand Russell said "The law of causation, according to which later events can theoretically be predicted by means of earlier events, has often been held to be a priori , a necessity of thought, a category without which science would not be possible. If a being with such a mind existed, we could play no game of chance with him ; we should always lose.

For him, in fact, the word chance would have no meaning, or rather there would be no such thing as chance. We know that even in a world with microscopic chance, macroscopic objects are determined to an extraordinary degree. Newton's laws of motion are deterministic enough to send men to the moon and back.

In our Cogito model, the Macro Mind is macroscopic enough to ignore quantum uncertainty for the purpose of the reasoning will. The neural system is robust enough to insure that mental decisions are reliably transmitted to our limbs. We call this kind of determinism "adequate determinism. Quantum uncertainty leads some philosophers to fear an undetermined world of chance, one where Chrysippus' imagined collapse into chaos would occur and reason itself would fail us.

But the modest indeterminism required for free will is no chaotic irrational threat, since most physical and mental events are overwhelmingly "adequately determined. There is no problem imagining that the three traditional mental faculties of reason - perception, conception, and comprehension - are all carried on with "adequate determinism" in a physical brain where quantum events and thermal noise do not interfere with normal operations.

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There is also no problem imagining a role for chance in the brain in the form of quantum level noise as well as pre-quantal thermal noise. Noise can introduce random errors into stored memories. Noise could create random associations of ideas during memory recall. Many scientists have speculated that this randomness may be driven by microscopic fluctuations that are amplified to the macroscopic level.

This would not happen in some specific location in the brain. It is most likely a general property of all neurons. We distinguish seven increasingly sophisticated ideas about the role of chance and indeterminism in the question of free will. Many libertarians have accepted the first two. Determinist and compatibilist critics of free will make the third their central attack on chance, claiming that it denies moral responsibility. But very few thinkers appear to have considered all seven essential requirements for chance to contribute to libertarian free will.

Chance exists in the universe. Quantum mechanics is correct. Indeterminism is true, etc. Chance is important for free will because it breaks the causal chain of determinism. But chance cannot directly cause our actions. We cannot be responsible for random actions. At the same time, Father and Son are one God, and not two Gods. Origen reflects on the perfection of the One and the imperfection of the Dyad — the idea that is found in Plato, Aristotle, and Alexander — in another Greek passage, albeit fragmentary: Sel.

The same is the case with another Greek, though fragmentary, passage, Sel. This is a good example of how Origen — like Philo before him — read the tenets of Platonism in Scripture. This was natural to him, since he was convinced that Plato was actually inspired by the Jewish Scripture, and that the same Logos that revealed itself in the Bible — which is the body of Christ the Logos — also inspired Greek philosophers in their best doctrines, of course the doctrines that Origen found compatible with Christianity.

This is why he taught all philosophical schools at his university, apart from the atheistic ones, which could not possibly be compatible with Christianity.

Aristotle's Concept of Chance: Accidents, Cause, Necessity, and Determinism

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